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Global warming poses unprecedented dangers to humankind, and it is a product of human activities: Production and 
consumption of fossil fuels, accompanied by steadily increasing levels of greenhouse gasses in the atmosphere.  Some of the 
predicted consequences of warming are already upon us; yet more catastrophic effects will be experienced in the future.  Two 
behavioral processes operate to maintain fossil fuel use: 1) Delay discounting studies suggest that relatively lesser-valued 
outcomes (e.g., driving private cars) that are available now are likely to be preferred to the value of a sustainable planet for all 
humankind, to be achieved in the indefinite future; and 2) ongoing fossil-fueled activities are likely to be highly persistent 
because of the long and rich history of reinforcement for individuals (e.g., comfort and convenience) and for the fossil-fuel 
industry as a whole (e.g., jobs and profits). One way to counter that persistence is to tax greenhouse gas emissions, which can 
shift current incentives away from fossil-fuel based energy toward renewables, even though the ultimate slowing of climate 
change may be remote.  Carbon-tax contingencies are similar to those employed to treat problem behavior; a successful 
example of this approach is described. 
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RESUMO 
O aquecimento global engendra perigos sem precedentes para a humanidade e é um produto de atividades humanas: 
a produção e o consumo de combustíveis fósseis, acompanhados de níveis cada vez maiores de gases de efeito estufa na 
atmosfera. Algumas das consequências previstas do aquecimento já se fazem presentes; efeitos ainda mais catastróficos serão 
experimentados no futuro. Dois processos comportamentais operam para manter o uso de combustíveis fósseis: 1) Estudos 
sobre descontos do atraso das consequências sugerem que resultados de valor relativamente menor que estão disponíveis 
agora (e.g., dirigir carros pessoais) são provavelmente preferidos frente ao valor de um planeta sustentável para toda a 
humanidade, a ser atingido em um futuro indefinido e 2) atividades atuais que envolvem o uso de combustíveis fósseis são, 
provavelmente, muito persistentes devido à longa e rica história de reforçamento para indivíduos (e.g., conforto e 
conveniência) e para a indústria de combustíveis fósseis como um todo (e.g., empregos e lucros). Uma maneira de confrontar 
essa persistência é taxar as emissões de gases de efeito estufa, o que pode transferir os incentivos atuais da energia baseada 
em combustíveis fósseis para as energias renováveis, mesmo que o abrandamento final das mudanças climáticas seja remoto. 
As contingências de taxação do carbono são semelhantes às empregadas para tratar o comportamento problema; descreve-se 
um exemplo bem-sucedido desta abordagem. 
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In 2014, the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) assembled data from many sources showing 
that if the rate of fossil fuel consumption continues its 
present upward trajectory, the predicted effects on the 
earth’s climate will be large and irreversible:  Within a few 
decades, temperatures will increase by about 7 degrees C, 
ice sheets will melt (this is already happening), and as a 
result, sea levels will rise by as much as 7 meters.  
According to the Union of Concerned Scientists (2017), 
frequent flooding is already forcing some residents abandon 
low-lying islands along the US east coast.  And this is just 
the beginning of the list of accompanying consequences, 
such as droughts and spread of infectious diseases; almost 
every week a new prediction of calamity is announced.   
In the Paris Agreement of 2016, the international 
community agreed on national commitments to reduce 
greenhouse gasses.  Even if current commitments to reduce 
greenhouse gasses are actually achieved, the warming trend 
will continue, albeit at a slower pace than if fossil fuel 
consumption were to continue at its present rate, so that the 
world’s nations will have more time to move toward a zero-
carbon economy.  But these relatively abstract concerns 
about the distant future may be too far removed from current 
circumstances that maintain ongoing fossil fuel consumption 
to be effective in changing human behavior.  This was the 
principal topic of Skinner’s (1991) article entitled “Why we 
are not acting to save the world.”  The present essay will 
discuss near-term changes in behavior relevant to global 
warming.   
There are at least two fundamental behavioral 
processes that can help us to understand the ineffectiveness 
of temporally remote outcomes:  Choice between 
alternatives that differ in the values and delays of their 
consequences, and the persistence of activities that are 
sustained by their recent histories of reinforcement.   
 
INTERTEMPORAL CHOICE 
Many studies of choice between alternatives that 
differ in delay to an outcome, and the value of that outcome, 
have suggested that both humans and animals often prefer a 
small reward after little or no delay (smaller-sooner, or SS) 
to a larger reward after a long delay (larger later, or LL).  A 
consistent preference for relative immediacy is often termed 
“impulsivity.”  However, natural selection may favor 
organisms that take advantage of immediate food or other 
biological necessities; a larger delayed alternative may arrive 
too late to sustain life.  Moreover, “impulsivity” can be 
restrained or reversed by various commitment mechanisms 
(e.g., Rachlin & Green, 1972). 
Empirically, the degree of preference between 
outcomes depends on the relative magnitudes of the delays 
and amounts, as suggested by Mazur’s (1987) widely 
adopted expression: 
V = A/(1+kD)  Eq. 1 
 
Where A is the magnitude of reward and D is the 
delay to its presentation. The scaling parameter k 
characterizes variations in sensitivity to delay: A large value 
amplifies the effect of increasing delays (see Odum, 2011, 
for review and discussion).  The addition of 1 in the 
denominator keeps the equation from exploding when the 
delay is 0.  
This simple hyperbolic-decay equation predicts a 
rapid decrease in outcome value as D increases from near 0, 
slowing as D becomes indefinitely large, with rate of 
decrease depending on k.  Although various refinements 
have been proposed, Eq. 1 does a first-rate job of describing 
delay discounting data from many studies in which people or 
animals are offered a choice between SS and LL 
alternatives, either hypothetical or real. 
Let’s consider interpreting responses to the threat of 
climate catastrophe in relation to Eq. 1. In terms of the 
dichotomy proposed above, LL corresponds to the 
achievement of a sustainable planet for all of humankind 
(large!) at some uncertain time in the future (later) by 
moving to a carbon-free economy.  The alternative SS 
corresponds to the current but lesser value of continuing to 
burn fossil fuels in order to maintain our lifestyles.  Because 
the value V of SS experienced by any individual (especially 
a CEO of an energy corporation) is greater than that of the 
predicted LL alternative, which may be achieved slowly (if 
at all) through global efforts spread out over decades, there 
is no basis in individual preferences for the massive, 
sustained political action that would be needed to reduce 
fossil fuel consumption across the planet as a whole. 
The foregoing is conjectural, based in part on the data 
on choice between immediate and delayed outcomes, and in 
part on the daily news, where predictions of calamity are 
printed side-by-side with reports of lobbying against 
restrictions on use of fossil fuels and denial of the climate 
consequences.  Nevertheless, we can gain some 
understanding by measuring individual judgments of 
humans in an equivalent of the delay-discounting paradigm 
with well-defined concrete alternatives.  People could be 
asked to choose between continuing to drive your present car 
(assumed to be in good working order, SS), and an 
opportunity to buy an all-electric vehicle costing $35,000 
with a rebate of $A to be paid D months after purchase (LL).  
The value of D could be varied from trial to trial to identify 
an indifference point D for each of several values of A to 
map out a set of hyperbolic functions.  To address possible 
determiners of k, and hence the value of the indifference 
point, people could be tested after watching videos about 
predicted effects of global warming as compared to neutral 
material.   
The only relevant example is a study by Berry et al. 
(2014), who arranged standard delay-discounting tasks with 
choices between SS and LL outcomes specified as 
hypothetical sums of money.  Images of natural landscapes, 
man-made structures, or geometric figures were presented 
before trials.  They found that natural images decreased 
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discounting rates (k) by about half.   The results at least 
suggest that real-life decisions could be affected by well-




There is a second process that can combine with delay 
discounting to exacerbate the problem – the persistence of 
ongoing behavior.  Many experiments with humans and 
animals have shown that the resistance to change of operant 
behavior is directly related to the amount and frequency of 
reinforcers obtained during an organism’s history.  These 
results have been interpreted in relation to Behavioral 
Momentum Theory (Nevin & Grace, 2000), which uses an 
analog to Newton’s Second Law of Motion to suggest that 
the persistence of reinforced responding in a distinctive 
context during some form of disruption depends directly on 
the magnitude of a disruptor, and inversely on a mass-like 
term representing the amount and frequency of 
reinforcement experienced in that context.  
Consider driving one’s present car, as in the SS 
example above, is ongoing operant behavior with an 
extensive history of reinforcement that occurs repeatedly, 
and cannot really be compared with the LL choice of a 
rebate for buying hypothetical electric vehicle.  Here’s a 
personal example.  I live on an island whose low-lying 
towns, homes, and farms will be inundated within a few 
decades if sea levels rise as predicted; and I am well aware 
of the predictions and their dependency on the rate of 
greenhouse gas emission.  Nevertheless, I drive my modest 
30+ mpg Toyota almost every day and enjoy all sorts of 
reinforcing consequences:  I pick up groceries, visit friends, 
get health checkups, attend concerts and movies, and go to 
meetings with like-minded islanders on how to influence 
state and local energy policy, all of which enhance my 
general well-being and enjoyment of life.  I suggest that the 
sum of these and other reinforcers for driving, accumulated 
over many years, have established a substantial behavioral 
mass of driving in the context of my daily life.   
What might disrupt such well-established behavior?  
In principle, frequent reminders of the fact that my 2004 
Toyota deposits about 6 metric tonnes (mT) of carbon into 
the atmosphere per year could have some impact. But in the 
overall scale of the world’s carbon emissions, this is trivial – 
scarcely worth the effort of trying to conserve by refraining 
from driving – so I will probably continue to drive my car as 
long as I can. Because of its cumulative adverse 
consequences for the atmosphere, however, driving can 




Now let’s extrapolate from an individual driving a car 
to the global business of extracting, transporting, refining, 
distributing, and selling fossil fuels and their byproducts.  
Because the global fossil-fuel business has produced rich 
and widespread rewards over many years, including jobs for 
workers, comfort and convenience for consumers, profits for 
shareholders, and astounding wealth for top executives, I 
suggest that this business has acquired an aggregate 
behavioral mass that will make it extraordinarily resistant to 
change.  
If we construe the ongoing activities of extracting, 
refining, and selling fossil fuels as problem behavior on a 
global scale, what sort of feasible intervention can help to 
reduce it in the near future?  Students of microeconomics 
will note that for frequent drivers, gasoline consumption is 
highly inelastic:  For example, a 10% increase in the price of 
gasoline will lead to far less than a 10% decrease in 
consumption (for a primer on determiners of elasticity, see 
Hursh, Madden, Spiga, DeLeon, & Francisco, 2013).  Thus, 
the persistence of gasoline consumption can be explained by 
a microeconomic model as well as by the reinforcement-
based persistence of driving behavior (for discussion of the 
relations between behavioral economics and behavioral 
momentum, see Nevin, 1995).   
Microeconomic theory proposes that the inelasticity 
of gasoline consumption arises from the absence of 
substitutes. Thus, to make gasoline consumption more 
elastic, alternative power sources are needed, such as solar- 
or wind-generated power for electric vehicles.  At the same 
time, the price of gasoline should be increased to reflect 
what economists call externalities – the costs to the public at 
large of dumping greenhouse gasses freely into the 
atmosphere as byproducts of production and consumption.  
This would increase the cost of gasoline at the pump and 
tend to reduce consumption (thereby reducing profits for 
producers), and provide incentives for businesses to develop 
affordable alternatives. 
A number of economists have proposed a fairly 
straightforward way to encourage development of 
alternatives and to charge for the production and use of fuels 
that generate greenhouse gasses: a “carbon tax” imposed by 
a regional or national government, but without any 
regulatory agency that restricts emissions.   Such a tax 
allows people to burn as much fuel as they like, but they 
must pay according to the amount of carbon they emit into 
the atmosphere.  Thus, a carbon tax can be politically 
palatable for libertarians as well as environmentalists, and is 
widely supported by economists (e.g., The Guardian, 2016).  
The empirical question is whether such a tax is effective in 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions. 
In behavioral terms, a carbon tax implies a set of 
contingencies:  Response cost for fossil fuel consumption, 
and reinforcers for switching to alternatives based on solar- 
or wind-generated electric power.  To be effective, of 
course, these alternatives must be affordable for people with 
limited incomes.  The effective cost of alternatives can be 
reduced by a “revenue-neutral” carbon tax that distributes at 
least some of its proceeds to taxpayers, with special 
consideration for low-income consumers.  (With respect to 
the material above on delay discounting, research could 
evaluate preferences between smaller-sooner and larger-later 
rebates to maximize taxpayer satisfaction.) 
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Data on the consequences of taxing carbon emissions, 
from the Canadian province of British Columbia (BC), 
suggest that this approach can be both effective and popular.  
Here’s a summary of data from BC’s program, which was 
established in 2008.  The BC tax started at $10/ton of carbon 
(or equivalent greenhouse gas), and increased $5 each year 
up to $30.  Every resident received a $100 check just before 
the tax kicked in, and there is a low-income tax credit for 
families with incomes below $37,000. As of 2015, the tax 
has brought in some $5 billion in revenue so far, with $3 
billion returned as business tax cuts, $1 billion in individual 
tax cuts, and $1 billion in low-income tax credits.  Most 
importantly, there have been greater decreases in fossil fuel 
consumption and carbon emissions than in the rest of 
Canada, with no overall decrease in economic activity.  (For 
a description of BC’s program, its political success, and its 
popularity with residents, see Mother Jones, 2014).  
As behavior analysts seeking to effect durable 
behavior change, we look to behavioral contingencies such 
as arranging response cost for problem behavior, 
concurrently with access to a reinforced, socially desirable 
alternative.  Extrapolated to climate-related activities 
aggregated over many people, from consumers to suppliers 
of fossil fuels, this sort of approach to problem behavior is 
entirely consistent with widely endorsed economic 
approaches that emphasize the power of near-term incentives 
to alter human behavior.  
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Footnote: 1. In applied behavior analysis, a standard method for reducing or eliminating problem behavior is to reinforce an incompatible, 
socially desirable alternative.  A number of basic research studies and clinical applications have shown that arranging concurrent 
reinforcement within the same context as problem behavior, either contingent on alternative behavior or independently of responding, can 
have the counter-therapeutic effect of increasing the persistence and post-treatment relapse of problem behavior (for review see Podlesnik 
& DeLeon, 2015).  
Nevin (2003) argued from these findings to suggest that driving, as a problem behavior, could become more persistent if a variety 
of other reinforcers that are not dependent on driving were available in the same context.  The presence of such reinforcers in my 
comfortable daily life should promote the persistence of daily activities such as driving a car.  This extrapolation is speculative, of course, 
but it suggested a behavioral interpretation of the “inertia of affluence,” a phrase introduced by McKibben (1989) to describe the lack of 
effort, by people living in comfortable situations, to preserve a valued environment.  I omit that line of argument here because a) the direct 
reinforcing consequences of driving are sufficient to make the case; b) the added reinforcers must be experienced concurrently, not 
successively, in the “same” context, which is not well defined as “daily life;” and c) recent empirical and theoretical analysis, summarized 
by Nevin et al. (2017), challenge the mechanism whereby added reinforcers are presumed to affect persistence. 
